Monday 17 March 2008

Saying the unsayable


The second reason I'm pissed with academia is that it's virtually impossible to say anything vaguely controversial without being bounced away from the good journals. Take you for an example. There are two main approaches to who you are in the social sciences.

The first, promoted by postmodernists, is that you only exist because people talk about you. What you believe to be 'you' is actually a mirage, a transparency that takes the multiple images of the talk that it encounters. Some postmodernists* are more sophisticated and throw in a bit of reflexivity (you think? really?) but none have really tackled the key objection which is, if you are just a 'mirage' that is created by social forces then how the buggery do you do manage to do stuff to change those forces?

The second, bigged up by the realists* out there, is that you do things because you, well, you exist. For a while they argued that we did what we did because social structures and institutions made us think and act in certain ways. However, faced with people who often do the opposite, they have come up with various ways of explain how these entrepreneurs and resisters can do what they do. However, explanations for how choice and innovative action come about are still pretty much in their infancy.

What I would like to add to this debate is that you (the actor, self, agent or - god forbid - person) when deciding to do something, are not simply governed by the rules of society but are also constrained and enabled by your psychological state and your biological architecture. In other words, when you chose to resist social rules or make an informed choice, these processes, whilst heavily influenced by society, can not be explained without reference to very real constraints that are inside you.

This simple statement is self evident to most lay people. Our conversations, assumptions and common sense are all geared towards understanding people that react differently in some situations because of their genes, their 'nature' or their current psychological state. Now, there will be two completely different reactions to this sentence. Lay (i.e. normal) people will not see anything objectionable here and will hopefully be wondering what all the fuss is about. Social scientists will have seen the words genes, nature and psychological, and be screaming essentialism, or, more likely, will have assumed this is a weak argument and turned to a different website.

How can it be so obvious to the lay person that their actions are, in part, explained by their biological and psychological states, yet so anathemaeic to sociologists? This is one of the many reasons, of course, why the public, 'proper' scientists and policy makers spend much of their time avoiding, if not laughing, at academics. I'm starting to wonder who the first person will be to notice that the (expensive) emperor's new clothes don't just fit badly....

* I've obviously simplified the pomo and realist positions somewhat but, seriously, their models of who you are are generally so theoretically unhinged and blatantly unrealistic that I'm not sure how they've got away with it for this long without being horsewhipped through town.

3 comments:

Anonymous said...

Hi Joe,
I fully subscribe to the point made by you about 'intellectual masturbation'. Nevertheless, asserting that Marxism has a flawed ontology while at the same time generally dismissing post-structuralism as irrelevant (which often tries to address this very problem of the Marxist legacy)is a bit paradoxical, isn't it. Also, I think there is room within post-structuralism to make a genuine 'social critique' (e.g. the work of Laclau/Mouffe, Zizek etc.)Regards, Buckley05

doctor baloney said...

Hello Prof Buckley. I wouldn't argue too much with you that Laclau et al do incorporate social critique (though would debate the extent to which they make it compatible with a pomo ontology). But that wasn't my point. I just wanted to illustrate how difficult it is to say something rather commonsensical within the strictures of academic theory.

I don't think Marxism (or critical realism) has a flawed ontology just that it hasn't been adapted by anyone I've read to deal sensibly with the self.

It just makes it all seem a little pointless when such simple things are so hard to articulate....

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